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A Macroeconomic Assessment of the European Monetary Union 
Qin Wang
♣
 
 
Since the inception of Euro in 1999, a single currency and the Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) have past more than ten years. By and large, stepping into EMU represents one of the key 
aspects of EU’s successful integration. For most of its short life, the European Union has been 
driven mainly by the goal of economic integration. From a limited experiment in economic 
cooperation during the early 1950s, boarded in the 1960s to become a custom union, wrestled 
during the 1970s with attempts to build common economic policies and exchange rate stability, 
focused on completing the single market during the late 1980s, to the Economic and Monetary 
union and a single currency at the present
1
 
, the European Union has followed a tortuous path. The 
paper starts with the effectiveness of EU’s monetary policy after the birth of Euro to explore the 
complex relationship between monetary policy and economic operation within the European 
Union.  
A Brief Introduction to European Economic and Monetary Union 
 
The latest – and perhaps riskiest – step in the process of European integration was taken in 
January 1999, when eleven EU member states locked in their exchange rates as a prelude to the 
final switch in July 2002 to a single European currency – the Euro. The issue of the single 
currency cuts to the heart of sovereignty and independence. After the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods System, breaking the peg of the U.S. dollar to gold, European leaders began to pay more 
attention to the idea of monetary union. The first attempt,  to plan the transition to a single 
currency,  derived from the Werner Committee during 1969-1970,  but was derailed by the 
international currency turbulence in the wake of the energy crises of the 1970s.  
        During the 1980s, with the sense that something needed to be done to reverse the EC’s 
relative economic decline, to respond to the superiority of the United States and Japan in high-
technology industries, and to exploit more fully the potential of its own market, the mood of the 
community changed. It was believed that monetary union could reduce duplicate effort, 
encourage joint research, and remove the final barriers that prevented European companies from 
doing business in all the member states
2
                                                            
    
♣ Qin Wang is a second year master student at the University of Miami, majoring in International Studies. She holds 
an undergraduate degree, majoring in international economics and trade, from Nanjing Audit University, China. 
. The next important step on the road to the full monetary 
integration in Europe was the creation of the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1979. The 
core of this system are the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) and the European Currency Unit 
(ECU) used as a unit of account in the intervention and credit mechanism and as a mutual means 
of settlement. For every member’s currency, a central rate against the ECU was calculated and 
these rates were used to find out a grid of bilateral central rates. The fluctuation bands were set at 
2.25% on either side of the central rate for most currencies but there was also another option for 
weaker currencies with margin of 6%. The Delors Report, one the most influential documents 
pertaining to the  European Union in terms of monetary policy (in effect leading to the 
establishment of EMS) was published in 1989. According to the report, the crucial issue was to 
centralize monetary authority by establishing a whole new institution the European System of 
Central Banks (ESCB). That report is treated as a prologue to the first Stage of launching the new 
    
1 McCormick, John. The European Union Politics and Policies. 1999.  
    
2 McCormick, John. The European Union Politics and Policies, 1999.  
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European currency
3. Despite its near-collapse during 1992-1993, when Britain and Italy left the 
ERM and several other countries had to devalue their currencies, the Maastricht Treaty affirmed 
the basic principles behind the plan and adopted a three-stage plan for economic and monetary 
union which ratified by the European Council in December 1991
4
         From an economic point of view, a monetary union is a rational choice for the majority of 
the EU members. The Mundell-Fleming model developed in the 1960s helps us understand the 
economic motive of EMU: “The Impossible Trinity” is the hypothesis in international economics 
that it is impossible to have all three at the same time: a fixed exchange rate, free capital 
movement and an independent monetary policy. “A country must pick two out of three. It can fix 
its exchange rate without emasculating its central bank, but only by maintaining controls on 
capital flows (like China today); it can leave capital movement free but retain monetary 
autonomy, but only by letting the exchange rate fluctuate (like Britain--or Canada); or it can 
choose to leave capital free and stabilize the currency, but only by abandoning any ability to 
adjust interest rates to fight inflation or recession (most of Europe)
.  
5”. To European Union, a 
single currency is imperative under the circumstance of such a highly integrated regional 
economy, common monetary policy means the loss of national monetary autonomy
6
         On the other hand, however, some economists refuted the assertion that a single market 
needed a single currency, let alone monetary union. They argued that monetary union would not 
necessarily increase trade and that the success of the EMS weakened the anti-inflationary 
argument for EMU. In regard with the nature of EMU, they held that the main push for EMU was 
political, not economic. It emanated mainly from Paris, Brussels, and Bonn. By joining a federal 
monetary system, member states would wrest some power back from the Bundesbank of 
Germany. This was the reasoning behind French finance Minister Edouard Balladur’s influential 
advocacy of EMU in early 1988. By the same token, Germany should have been the least happy 
about monetary union. But the German government, which in any event supports monetary union 
for political reasons, could hardly argue in favor of maintaining a monopoly over monetary in the 
European Community
. 
7
         Regardless which is the real impetus of monetary union, the Euro-zone is the only de facto 
common currency area that exists today, which has become a reality due to effective coordination 
between both political and economic integration
. 
8. There are two main benefits of a single 
currency to be considered. One is the elimination of transaction cost and the other is the 
elimination of exchange rate risk. There are also two most important costs: one is a cost of 
institutions and individuals adjustment to a new currency and the other is a lack of national 
monetary policy as an adjustment tool when a member state experiences an economic asymmetric 
shock
9
 
. 
The economic performance of the European Union after 1999 
 
Adoption of the euro signifies that Euro-zone members lose the autonomy of using monetary 
policy to regulate their macro economies, instead turn to the European Central Bank (ECB) to 
implement unified monetary policy. Ten years after, how is the performance of ECB monetary 
policy? In particular, whether it has fulfilled the tasks of ensuring price stability, economic 
                                                            
    
3 IRENEUSZ PSZCZÓLKA: Advantages and Disadvantages of Introducing the Euro 
    
4 Pascal Fontaine: Europe in 12 lessons 
    
5 Paul Krugman. Synopsis: Applauds Mundell's work while cautioning on what this Nobel was for 
  (http://www.pkarchive.org/global/canada.html) 
    
6 Ginsberg, Roy. Demiystifying the European Union,2000 
    
7 Dinan, Desmond.  Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration, 2000 
    
8 Maria Lorca:Is the euro, as a common currency, a tool for integration? Miami-Florida European Union Center of 
Excellence 
    
9 IRENEUSZ PSZCZÓLKA: Advantages and Disadvantages of Introducing the Euro  
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growth, full employment, balance of international payment and etc. within the union has sparked 
controversy. Generally speaking, ECB well accomplished the primary objective of maintaining 
price stability, which stabilizes economies in the union, however, with respect to other macro-
economic policy objectives, it has fulfilled rarely.   
 
Inflation rate 
 
Figure 1: Annual Inflation, 1999-2009 
 
  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
Belgium  1.1  2.7  2.4  1.6  1.5  1.9  2.5  2.3  1.8  4.5  0.0 
Netherlands  2  2.3  5.1  3.9  2.2  1.4  1.5  1.7  1.6  2.2  1.0 
Germany  0.6  1.4  1.9  1.4  1.0  1.8  1.9  1.8  2.3  2.8  0.2 
Ireland  2.5  5.3  4.0  4.7  4.0  2.3  2.2  2.7  2.9  3.1  -1.7 
Greece  2.1  2.9  3.7  3.9  3.4  3.0  3.5  3.3  3.0  4.2  1.3 
Spain  2.2  3.5  2.8  3.6  3.1  3.1  3.4  3.6  2.8  4.1  -0.3 
France  0.6  1.8  1.8  1.9  2.2  2.3  1.9  1.9  1.6  3.2  0.1 
Italy  1.7  2.6  2.3  2.6  2.8  2.3  2.2  2.2  2.0  3.5  0.8 
Cyprus  1.1  4.9  2.0  2.8  4.0  1.9  2.0  2.2  2.2  4.4  0.2 
Luxembourg  1  3.8  2.4  2.1  2.5  3.2  3.8  3.0  2.7  4.1  0.0 
Hungary        5.2  4.7  6.8  3.5  4.0  7.9  6.0  4.0 
Malta  2.3  3  2.5  2.6  1.9  2.7  2.5  2.6  0.7  4.7  1.8 
Austria  0.5  2.0  2.3  1.7  1.3  2.0  2.1  1.7  2.2  3.2  0.4 
Portugal  2.2  2.8  4.4  3.7  3.3  2.5  2.1  3.0  2.4  2.7  -0.9 
Slovakia  10.4  12.2  7.2  3.5  8.4  7.5  2.8  4.3  1.9  3.9  0.9 
Finland  1.3  2.9  2.7  2.0  1.3  0.1  0.8  1.3  1.6  3.9  1.6 
Euro area  
(16 countries) 
1.2  2.2  2.4  2.3  2.1  2.2  2.2  2.2  2.1  3.3  0.3 
EU  1.2  1.9  2.2  2.1  2.0  2.0  2.2  2.2  2.3  3.7  1.0  
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(27 countries) 
United States  2.2  3.4  2.8  1.6  2.3  2.7  3.4  3.2  2.8  3.8  -0.4 
Source: EuroStat
10
The primary objective of the ECB’s monetary policy is to maintain price stability. The ECB aims 
at inflation rates of below, but close to, 2% over the medium term.
 
11
 
 Overall, euro-zone inflation 
rate after 2000 slightly exceeded the target range, but the deviation was not great. The Euro area 
average annual Inflation between 1999 and 2009 is 2.25, lower than 2.53 of the U.S. In order to 
achieve the primary objective of price stability, ECB applies M3 growth rate as reference to 
evaluate the role of currency and interest rate instrument to implement monetary policy, which 
consistent with the macroeconomic condition in the euro area as a whole during the past eleven 
years. 
 
GDP Growth 
 
As for economic growth, the performance of euro-zone is unsatisfactory, it has been lower than 
that of the U.S. for five years, and it didn’t absolve the shock of financial crisis 2008. Moreover, 
we can see in Figure 3 that differences were reasonable to  begin  with,  but  that  they  have  
increased  over  the  last  decade.  The productivity difference between the slowest and fastest 
growing countries on average (Ireland and Portugal)  increased from 25 index points  in 1999  to 
66.2 in 2008;  the difference  in  unit  labor  costs  went  from  5.4  percentage  points  to  31.8
12
Figure 2: Annual Real GDP growth rate in percent, 2000-2009 
. 
   2000   2001   2002   2003   2004   2005   2006   2007   2008   2009  
Euro area 
(16 countries)  3.9  1.9  0.9  0.8  2.2  1.7  3.0  2.8  0.6  -4.1 
EU  
(27 countries)  3.9  2.0  1.2  1.3  2.5  2.0  3.2  2.9  0.7  -4.2 
United States  4.1  1.1  1.8  2.5  3.6  3.1  2.7  2.1  0.4  -2.4 
Source: EuroStat 
 
 
                                                            
    
10 EuroStat Website: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/ 
    
11European Central Bank Website (http://www.ecb.int/mopo/html/index.en.html) 
    
12 Sylvester C.W. Eijffinger: Policy Implications of Increasing Debt and Deficits, European Parliament, Economic 
and Monetary Affair, 2010  
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Figure 3: Annual GDP growth rate in percent in eleven Euro-zone members 
 
Source: EuroStat 
Unemployment Rate 
 
The economic growth plays a dominant role in accounting for the main swing in EU 
unemployment
13. The level of unemployment rate in the euro area is always high, particularly in 
Germany and France, these two major powers’ domestic unemployment rates stay higher than 
euro-zone  average  for many years. The difference in the unemployment rate rose from 10.1 
percentage points to 15.45
14
 
 in eleven years.  
 
Balance of International Payment 
 
The euro's rose against the dollar from 2003 was eroding demand for Europe's exports, making it 
hard for the region's economies to grow. In this case, as an export-oriented area and as imports 
and exports accounted for a huge proportion of its GDP, ECB should play the role of interest rate 
parity: make currency weaker to boost exports. However, confronted with the gradual warming of 
economy since 2000, ECB could only raise interest rate continuously as its priority of stabilizing 
prices in the euro area. This move ultimately forced German with such a low inflation rate 
became the “ballast” of euro-zone economy.  As interest rates continued to increase, the euro has 
                                                            
    
13 Marika KAranassou, Hector, and Dennis J. Snower: Unemployment in the European Union: 
Institution, Prices and Growth 
    
14 Based on data from Eurostat  
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become increasingly strong, statistics shows that euro-zone export growth rate has been lower 
than import growth rate since 2003
15
 
. 
 
Government Debt 
 
According to the convergence criteria, public debt is not allowed to exceed 60% of GDP. 
However, three members’ (Greece, Belgium, Italy) government debt remained extremely long 
and high, which will cast long shadows over euro-zone's future (see figure 4). In addition, we 
cannot find any convergence regarding government deficits and debt. In 1999, Finland boasted 
the smallest government debt, equal to 45.5% of GDP.  The difference with the largest debtor in 
the euro-zone, Italy, was 68.2%. Despite the most severe financial and economic crisis in almost 
a century, the Finnish national debt actually decreased by 2009, to 39.7%. Italy, meanwhile, 
failed to use the significant windfall from the steep decline in long-term interest rates caused by 
the introduction of the euro and a decade of rapid economic growth to repair its debt position.  
Italy’s debt barely budged and stayed well above 100% of GDP. As a result, the difference 
between the debt positions of Finland and Italy, the most prudent and most profligate euro-zone 
members, shot up to 71.7 percentage points in 2008
16
 
. 
Figure 4 Government debt as a percentage of GDP 
 
 
In a nutshell, EMU’s monetary policy succeeded in achieving price stability in the euro-zone as a 
whole, but as for economic growth, full employment and level of government debt, indicators did 
not match the macroeconomic goals. The  introduction  of the euro  in  1999,  it was  claimed, 
would  narrow  the  economic differences  between  the member  countries  of  the monetary  
union. Unemployment rates would converge, as would other important macroeconomic variables, 
such as unit labor costs, productivity, and fiscal deficits and government debt. Ultimately, the 
differences in wealth, measured in terms of income per capita, would diminish as well. This was 
also hoped for, as from the outset it was clear that a monetary union without a political union or at 
                                                            
    
15 Yang Li: An Overview of the euro-zone monetary policy 
    
16 Sylvester C.W. Eijffinger: Policy Implications of Increasing Debt and Deficits, European Parliament, Economic 
and Monetary Affair, 2010  
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least something resembling a political union in Europe would find it difficult to survive in the 
long term. After the common currency’s first decade, however, increased divergence has become 
the norm within the euro-zone, and tensions can be expected to increase. The differences between 
member  states were already large a decade ago. The euro became the common currency of 
wealthy countries, such as Germany, the Netherlands and Finland, and much poorer countries, 
such as Italy, Greece and Portugal.  Such differences were a highly complicating factor for the 
newly established ECB, which had to determine the appropriate interest rate for all members (the 
so-called ‘one size fits all’ policy)
17
 
.  As ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet said, we can only 
wish member countries coordinate their fiscal policies to achieve a similar level of inflation. This 
tacitly approved that ECB is powerless before members’ economic fundamentals convergence. 
Challenges faced by EMU 
 
Firstly, member states’ different economic fundamentals affect the role of a unified monetary 
policy. "Maastricht Treaty" has given the great independence to ECB, which even today is 
considered the world's most independent bank. Nevertheless, the focus of monetary policy by the 
ECB as a whole rather than a specific country euro zone, so in theory the logic is that how the 
performance of its monetary policy, the key is whether the euro area macroeconomic 
convergence, which is an important "economic base."
18
         Moreover, differences about the economic fundamentals also led to the dilemma in the 
formulation of monetary policy. For example in 1999 Ireland and several other small countries 
experienced a continued high inflation rate, requiring increases in interest rates to cool the 
economy, while other counties with low inflation rates needed to reduce interest rates to stimulate 
the economy. As a result, the successive interest rate cuts by the ECB between 2001 and2003 
were too lenient for Ireland–type countries in terms of monetary policy, while continuous interest 
rate hikes from 2005-2006 were too tight for Germany and certain other euro countries. The 
disparity in economic performance and inflationary pressures between Ireland and Germany (the 
wealthiest economy in the euro-zone) highlights a concern about EMU, the suitability of a one-
size-fits-all monetary policy to a collection of national economies that in many respects seen to be 
diverging rather than converging
 As the ECB's guiding interest rate is 
mainly based on the average price level of the euro area and the reference interest rate of 
Germany, its effect subject to the size of difference between the interest-rate target and the real 
equilibrium interest rate of members, the smaller the difference, the greater the effectiveness. The 
size of this difference depends on the degree of convergence of national economic fundamentals 
(in particular the price level), the more similar the member’ inflation rates, the more effective the 
monetary policy. Despite of  the convergence criteria, the undeniable economic characteristics, 
including interest rates, economic structure, income level and the previous objectives of monetary 
policy by central banks of member states still exists. After the launch of the euro, national 
differences in inflation rates have become very apparent by these factors, which led to the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect: the higher inflation countries had lower actual interest rate, as loose 
monetary policy favored their economic growth. In contrast, the lower inflation countries had 
higher real interest rates as the tightened policy restricted their economic growth. 
19
                                                            
    
17 Sylvester C.W. Eijffinger: Policy Implications of Increasing Debt and Deficits, European Parliament, Economic 
and Monetary Affair, 2010 
.  The Euro-zone's economic development therefore shows an 
apparent imbalance between less and more fiscally responsible countries, such as Germany (with 
a lower level of inflation), having to endure tight monetary policy. Maintaining economic growth 
in the euro area now depends on smaller and relatively less developed member countries  to 
comply with stability criteria. 
    
18 European Central Bank Website (http://www.ecb.int/mopo/html/index.en.html) 
    
19 Dinan, Desmond.  Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration, 2000  
 
10 
10 
          In addition, whereas economic policy could be formulated at different levels of 
government, responsibility for monetary policy would rest squarely with the European Central 
Bank. The Eurosystem comprises the ECB and the NCBs of those countries that have adopted the 
euro. It is responsible for defining and implementing the monetary policy of the euro area. This is 
a public policy function that is implemented mainly by financial market operations. Important for 
this task is the full control of the Eurosystem over the monetary base. As part of that, the ECB 
and the national central banks (NCBs) are the only institutions that are entitled to actually issue 
legal tender banknotes in the euro area. Given the dependency of the banking system on base 
money, the euro zone  is thus in a position to exert a dominant influence on money market 
conditions and money market interest rates
20
        Last but not least, the debt crisis exposed the existence of structural defects in the euro area, 
pointing to the euro's "soft rib". This crisis, if not be handled properly, could trigger a chain 
reaction, potentially dragging down the pace of economic recovery of the entire EU. To forestall 
this, Greece and several other countries, despite their already high levels of national debt, were 
given the green light for joining the euro zone. This raised questions in the minds of Euroskeptics 
about the seriousness with which member states were approaching the convergence criteria, the 
wisdom of which had already been questioned by many economists
. Nevertheless, the task of economic adjustment is 
mainly carried out through fiscal policy while member states face asymmetric economic shocks, 
although memberstates cannot be too independent as they are subject to the constraints of the 
common fiscal discipline, as otherwise the foundation of the unified monetary policy will be 
undermined. Therefore, the solution to this contradiction between the unified monetary policy and 
relative independent fiscal policy of member states has become the key of macro-economic 
policy coordination during the process of economic integration. 
21. Since the unified monetary 
policy without the unified fiscal policy, the euro area is like a "lame duck", lacks not only 
necessary means for binding members states to comply with the financial discipline, but also 
rendered helpless when member state plunged into crisis
22. Greek debt crisis shows no rescue 
package after weeks of debate within the EU is a proof of this deficiency, which is also a blow to 
confidence of the euro. So far, the European debt problem has the possibility of further 
deterioration.  Presently  the  national debt of  Iceland  (though not an EU-memberstate),  some 
central and eastern European countries, Greece and Ireland, in addition to Italy, Spain, Portugal, 
and Belgium, does not lead to optimism. More importantly, of the 27 EU member states, the 
deficit in 20 countries exceeded the 3% of GDP security cordon. If these countries do not adopt 
the  appropriate policies and measures, coping mechanisms to the debt problem may spread, 
leading to an additional negative impact
23
 
. 
Conclusion 
 
One of the principle motives behind European integration has been the argument that Europe 
must create the conditions in which it can meet external economic threats without being 
undermined by internal divisions. For many, the single currency – if it succeeds – will represent 
the crowning achievement of exactly fifty years’ worth of effort aimed at removing the barriers to 
trade among Europeans and the construction of a single market that will allow Europe to compete 
on the global stage from a position of strength. There is little question that the successful adoption 
of the euro makes the EU a substantial new actor in that international system
24
        However, the effects of EMU on the domestic economies of Europe are debatable. The 
analysis above illustrates that the degree of dispersion of the main economic indicators of the 
. 
                                                            
    
20 European Central Bank website/Monetary Policy (http://www.ecb.int/mopo/html/index.en.html) 
    
21 Dinan, Desmond.  Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration, 2000 
    
22 Greece debt crisis Sina News (http://finance.sina.com.cn) 
    
23 Debt problems exposed the fiscal and monetary policy (www.realugg.com) 
    
24 McCormick, John.  The European Union Politics and Policies, 1999  
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euro-zone members is still high, still need further convergence. Continuously strengthening 
policy coordination among countries to ensure a high degree of convergence of major economic 
indicators is the precondition of effective operation of the common monetary policy.  In short, a 
monetary policy is effectively implemented in necessary conditions. 
        One of the important factors that decide the euro’s future is the operating mechanism of 
monetary policy. Comparing the benefits of the single currency and unified monetary policy with 
their opportunity cost, if the former is more than the latter, the future of them will be bright; 
otherwise it could be bleak. Consequently, the coordination between the ECB, whose goal is to 
ensure the stable operation of the single currency policy and member states, which maintain 
relatively independent fiscal policy, becomes one of the key factors of economic stability and 
development in the euro-zone. The euro area monetary policy is formulated by the European 
Central Bank, while fiscal policy is distributed among member states under the Community 
financial discipline rules. The former is based on the requirements of the euro area's overall 
economic development, the ultimate goal is price stability in the euro area; while the latter is in 
response to asymmetric shocks confronted by member states on their own, the ultimate goal is 
giving full play of effective fiscal policy the as automatic stabilizers, pursuing their own 
economic stability and development. Since governments of the member states co-exist with the 
European Central Bank, conflicts are inevitable. Yet the advent of the euro as single currency for 
more than ten years of smooth operation proves the EMU to be successful to some extent; yet we 
cannot ignore its inherent instability and potential conflicts.  
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